In a decentralized supply chain, with long-term competition between independent retailers facing random demands and buying from a common supplier, how should wholesale and retail prices be specified, in an attempt to maximize supply-chain wide profits? We show what types of coordination mechanisms allow the decentralized supply chain to generate aggregate expected profits equal to the optimal profits in a centralized system, and how the parameters of these (perfect) coordination schemes can be determined. We assume that the retailers face stochastic demand functions which may depend on all of the firms' prices as well as a measure of their service level, e.g., the steady-state availability of the product. We systematically compare the coordination mechanisms when retailers compete only in terms of their prices, and when they engage in simultaneous price-and service competition.
Introduction
In a decentralized supply chain, with long-term competition between independent retailers facing random demands and buying from a common supplier, how should wholesale and retail prices be specified, in an attempt to maximize supply-chain wide profits? The design of effective coordination mechanisms in supply chains has recently received considerable attention in the operations management literature, following on earlier work in economics (see e.g., Tirole 1988 and Mathewson and Winter 1984) and the marketing literature on channel coordination (see e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1983 and Moorthy 1987) . Ideally, a coordination mechanism allows the decentralized supply chain to generate aggregate expected profits equal to those in the first-best solution, i.e., the optimal profits in a centralized system. We refer to such mechanisms as perfect coordination schemes. This paper develops such schemes for settings where the retailers compete in terms of their pricing strategies, as well as those where they compete simultaneously in terms of their prices and long-term service levels.
A variety of pricing structures and contractual arrangements have been discussed in the operations management literature, see e.g., the surveys by Lariviere (1999) , Tsay et al. (1999) and Cachon (2002) . This parallels innovations in many industries where suppliers increasingly adopt non-standard pricing schemes to influence retail prices, retail sales and supply chain profits.
1 The adoption of so-called revenue sharing schemes has revolutionized the video rental industry.
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However, most of the literature considers coordination mechanisms for a supply chain with a single retailer, thereby avoiding the complications which arise under any type of competition between retailers. As to the sparse literature on coordination mechanisms for supply chains with competing retailers, a few papers (in particular Padmanbhan and Png 1995 , Deneckere et al. 1996 , van Ryzin and Mahajan 1999 , Cachon 2002 §5, and Bernstein and Federgruen 2001a address this question in a single period setting, see below for a more detailed discussion. A few other papers address infinite horizon models but assume
1 See e.g., Ailawadi et al. (1999) who report that, across forty packaged good categories included in the Market Fact Book, no less than 37% of retail sales were made "on deal", i.e., on the basis of one or several such pricing schemes. 2 The studios have drastically reduced their wholesale prices, from $70 per copy to between $3 and $8 (see Exhibit 4 in Narayanan and Brem 2002) in exchange for a given percentage (up to 55%) of the total rental revenues. Such schemes are believed to have increased supply-chain wide revenues by up to 30%, see Shapiro (1998) and Ostricher (1999) . It has resulted in a major shake-out of primarily smaller independent video stores (see e.g., Narayanan and Brem 2002) .
that demands occur at a constant deterministic rate and that all demands are satisfied fully and immediately, an ideal service level which, under deterministic demands, can easily be guaranteed. Here, retailer competition is confined to price or quantity competition. (See Chen et al. 2001, Bernstein and Federgruen 2003 , and the references cited therein.)
Under random demands, the competitive dynamics between the retailers are considerably more complex, when viewed in a multi-period or infinite horizon setting. First, each retailer needs to complement his basic competitive instrument(s), e.g., his retail price or pricing strategy, with an efficient strategy to replenish his inventory from the supplier. Second, the distributions of the random demands, faced by the retailers, will in general depend on the service levels provided by the competing retailers, i.e., the (steady-state) availability of their products. We observe an increasing number of industries in which some of the competing retailers aggressively attempt to obtain larger market shares by providing higher levels of service. For example, in the fierce competition between amazon.com and barnesandnoble.com, the latter initiated a massive advertising campaign promising same business day delivery in various parts of the country. These complications result in significant challenges when designing a coordination mechanism for the supply chain, the main objective of this paper.
To analyze the mechanism design questions, we assume one of several systems of demand processes whose distributions are functions of all retailer prices and all announced service levels, quantified as the firms' no-stockout frequency, i.e., the fraction of time during which the firm does not run out-of-stock.
3 Bernstein and Federgruen (2002) consider alternative service measures, e.g., the likelihood with which customers receive delivery within a given promised time limit. We particularly focus on two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier servicing a network of retailers. We analyze a periodic review, infinite horizon model, with the retailers facing a stream of demands that are independent across time but not necessarily across firms. End-of-the-period inventories are carried over to the next period.
We assume that stockouts are backlogged; see, however, §6 for a discussion of the lost sales case. Each retailer may place an order with the supplier, at the beginning of each period.
Similarly, the supplier may, at the beginning of the period, replenish her inventory from an outside source. She fills the retailers' orders from her own inventory or, in case of stockouts, from an "emergency or backup" source. Such emergency procurements incur additional costs. The retailers and the supplier pay facility-specific inventory carrying and variable order costs. In addition, the retailers may incur out-of-pocket backlogging costs, which are proportional with the size of the backlogs. Contrary to most standard inventory models, but more representative of actual cost/service tradeoffs experienced in practice, ours does not require that direct backlogging costs exist. Even in their absence, every firm has a proper incentive to carry appropriate safety stocks, since a large stockout frequency reduces the retailer's average sales and it increases that of the competitors. We also show that backlog penalties may need to be charged to the retailers, as part of a (perfect) coordination scheme.
We first consider the case where the firms' service levels are exogenously specified. Here, we show that, under a few minor regularity conditions, the system can be coordinated perfectly when governed by an optimal combined set of so-called base stock policies. Coordination is achieved with a simple linear wholesale pricing scheme, i.e., with constant per unit wholesale prices, specified once and for all at the beginning of the infinite planning horizon. An alternative perfect coordination mechanism can be designed with a Price Discount Sharing Scheme (PDS). Here, the supplier subsidizes or compensates the retailer for part of the dollar amount the retailer discounts his retail price from a given list price. (The subsidy percentage varies with the size of the retailer's discount, giving rise to a so-called non-linear PDS.) While the PDS is of a more complex structure than a simple linear pricing scheme, it has the advantage of allowing for a continuous menu of pricing schemes. (The linear wholesale pricing scheme, in contrast, allows only for a single vector of constant per unit wholesale prices.) The results contrast with those in the single period model in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001a) in which stockouts are assumed to result in lost sales. There, perfect
coordination cannot be achieved with a simple linear wholesale pricing scheme; instead, it is essential to combine such a scheme with a guarantee by the supplier to buy back any unsold units at a given (retailer specific) buy-back rate. Similarly, if a PDS is used, it needs to be combined with a buy-back guarantee where, in this case, the buy-back rate is adjusted as a function of the chosen retail price. Finally, in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001a) 's single period model, the stochastic demand functions do not depend on the firms' service levels; that model therefore does not permit us to analyze how the equilibria and parameters of any coordination schemes are affected by these service levels.
We next proceed with the "full equilibrium" model, in which the firms' service levels are endogenously determined, along with their equilibrium retail prices. In this model, the retailers compete in terms of two distinct strategic instruments, i.e., (i) their retail prices (or, equivalently, their expected sales targets), and (ii) their announced service level targets (no-stockout frequencies). Here, a perfect coordination scheme can be designed on the basis of a specific vector of constant per unit wholesale prices, combined with a vector of constant per unit backlogging cost penalties to be paid by the retailers to the supplier (or vice versa).
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This type of coordination scheme was first introduced by Celikbas et al. (1997) to coordinate the marketing and production functions within a single firm and by Lariviere (1999) in the context of a single retailer, single period model in which the retail price, and hence the demand distribution, is exogenously given. The scheme is also related to the "lost sales transfer payment" scheme in Cachon (2002, §5) for a setting with a single retailer facing an exogenously specified (Poisson) demand process, with stockouts resulting in lost sales: a given fee is to be paid by the retailer to the supplier (or by the supplier to the retailer) for every unit in lost sales. The backlogging penalties are most easily implemented when they are negative, i.e., when they are to be paid by the supplier to the retailer: here, the retailer is properly incentivized to report any backlogs so as to recover the backlogging penalties. If the penalty is positive, a possible way for the supplier to monitor backlogs at the retailers would involve rebate coupons to be distributed to the customer (perhaps along with the warranty or service registration card) and to be sent in to the supplier or a third party.
As mentioned, we refer to the recent surveys by Tsay et al. (1999) , Lariviere (1999) and Cachon (2002) for a systematic review of proposed coordination mechanisms in two-echelon supply chains. Here, we review the literature on coordination mechanisms for supply chain models with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. To our knowledge, all existing models assume a single period and are therefore unable to analyze how the firms' equilibrium behavior or any coordination mechanism depend on any (long-term) service measures. van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) address this question in a setting where the retailers compete in terms of their initial inventory, as customers choose retailers based on the availability of stocks. The authors confine themselves to simple linear wholesale pricing schemes with a constant per unit wholesale price, and investigate how close the best such scheme comes to achieving the first best solution. In contrast to the van Ryzin and Mahajan-model, Cachon (2002, §5) shows that a linear wholesale pricing scheme achieves perfect coordination, if the retailer demands are perfectly correlated and arise in proportion to their initial stocks. Deneckere et al. (1996 Deneckere et al. ( , 1997 consider a model with perfect competition and a (uniform) market clearing price which depends on the aggregate inventory of the retailers according to one of two demand functions, corresponding to two possible states of the general economy.
Once again, a simple linear wholesale pricing scheme fails to be coordinating; the authors propose to combine it with a resale price maintenance scheme instead, under which the 4 These wholesale prices and backlogging penalties are again specified once and for all at the beginning of the infinite planning horizon.
retailers are obliged to set their price above a given threshold. Png (1995, 1997) on earlier inventory models with price-and/or service sensitive demand processes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In §2, we introduce our model and notation. §3 deals with the case where service levels are predetermined and §4 with the case where the retailers simultaneously compete in terms of their price and service levels. In §5 we report on a numerical study designed to compare the equilibria under price competition as well as combined price-and service competition with the centralized solution, including an assessment of the parameters of our perfect coordination schemes. §6 completes the paper with conclusions and a discussion of extensions to our model.
Model and Notation
Consider a two-echelon supply chain with a supplier selling to N independent retailers, each ] as well as an order quantity to be ordered from the supplier. Similarly, the supplier chooses, at the beginning of each period, a replenishment quantity to be procured from an outside source.
The supplier may have ample capacity to fill the retailer orders with negligible lead-time.
In this case, the supplier does not need to build up any inventories and she never experiences any stockouts. The more interesting case is when the supplier cannot respond passively to incoming orders but must anticipate these with an appropriate replenishment strategy. This situation arises, e.g., when the supplier's procurement mechanism is constrained by a capacity limit or when her replenishment orders fail to be filled instantaneously, but become available during or at the end of the period in which they are placed. When faced with stockouts, the supplier takes advantage of a backup or emergency source to fill the uncovered part of the retailer orders. For example, the supplier may subcontract at the last minute or schedule overtime production. Thus all retailer orders can be filled at the requested level, albeit that procurements from the backup source are associated with significant additional costs. Decisions are made in the following sequence: at the beginning of each period, all retailers simultaneously determine their price and order quantity for that period; next, these orders are filled immediately (when necessary, with the help of an emergency order to clear a stockout at the supplier), after which the supplier decides on the next replenishment order.
Each retailer incurs holding costs which are proportional with the inventory he carries.
Stockouts at the retailers are backlogged. See however §6 for a discussion of the case where stockouts result in lost sales. A retailer may incur direct, out-of-pocket backlogging costs; if so, these are proportional with the backlog size. Thus, for each retailer i = 1, ..., N , let
= the per period holding cost for each unit carried in inventory,
= the per period direct backlogging cost for any unit backlogged.
The supplier incurs variable "regular" procurement costs, as well as linear holding costs.
The additional procurement cost associated with any "emergency", end of the period procurement is given by a convex function h Following Bernstein and Federgruen (2001c) , the demand faced by each retailer i, in any period t, has a distribution which may depend on the entire vector of retail prices p in that period as well as the entire vector of the announced minimum service levels f = (f 1 , ..., f N ).
We thus allow a firm to provide better than its announced service level. We assume, however, that customer demand for a given firm depends on its specified rather than its actual service level, similar to it being dependent on the specified technical quality of the product (e.g., the product's expected lifetime). See Bernstein and Federgruen (2001c) 
with it a general continuous random variable whose distribution is stationary and independent of the vectors p and f . Thus, for all i = 1, ..., N , the sequence { it } has a common general cdf G i (·) with density function g i (·) and inverse cdf G
Without loss of generality, we assume E( it ) = 1, i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., which implies that ED it (p, f ) = d it (p, f ) and
, so that d i (p, f ) represents the expected demand value for retailer i.
Under the multiplicative model, the absolute level of any fractile of the demand distributionG i may depend on the complete vector of prices p and service levels f , but the ratio of any pair of fractiles is independent of p and f . Another implication of the multiplicative model is that the coefficient of variation of any one-period demand is an exogenously given constant, i.e., it is independent of p and f . See Bernstein and Federgruen (2001b) for a discussion of non-multiplicative demand models, with demand functions that depend on the price vector p, only. As is standard in virtually all inventory models, we assume that, for all i = 1, ..., N , the sequence of random variables { it : t = 1, 2, ...} is independent, so that the same independence property applies to the sequence {D it }. In contrast, the demands faced by the retailers in any given period, may be correlated and with a general joint distribution.
The mean sales functions satisfy the basic monotonicity properties:
i.e., a retailer's demand volume decreases with his own price and increases with the price of any of his competitors and it increases with his own service level and decreases with those of the competitors. We also expect that no firm's sales increase under a uniform price increase:
As in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001c) , we pay specific attention to the following classes of expected demand volume functions d(p, f ):
(I) The Attraction Model. Attraction models are among the most commonly used market share models, both in empirical studies and in theoretical models, see e.g., Leeflang et al. (2000) . Here, we assume a fixed potential market size M, with each retailer's actual market share determined by a vector of attraction values a = (a 1 , ..., a N ). More specifically, retailer i's market share is given by a i / N j=0 a j where a 0 is a constant representing the value of the no-purchase option. In our context, we assume that retailer i's attraction value a i depends on his retail price p i and his service level f i according to a general function a i = a i (p i , f i ). This gives rise to the system of expected demand functions:
We assume that the attraction values are decreasing in the price and increasing in the service variable, i.e., ∂a i ∂p i ≤ 0 and
We refer to Bell et al. (1975) for a discussion of how the attraction model arises as the only model satisfying four general axioms. Letã i = log a i . Common specifications include: (Ia) and (Ib) are special cases of the more general class:
propriate when the percentage increase in the attraction value of a firm, due to a marginal change in its price, is independent of the prevailing service level or vice versa.
Non-separable attraction functions are useful to represent increased or decreased sensitivity of the attraction values to price changes under a higher service level regime.
(II) The Linear Model. The average demand functions are linear in all prices and service levels, i.e.,
with b i , c ij , β i and γ ij positive constants.
(III) The Log-Separable Model. This demand model assumes that a regular system of price-dependent demand functions {q i (p)} is scaled up or down, as a function of the service levels f offered by the different firms. This gives rise to the specification:
with ψ i differentiable functions with ∂ψ i (f )/∂f i > 0, ∂ψ i (f )/∂f j < 0, j = i and with the normalization ψ(f, f, ..., f ) = 1.
Coordination Under Price Competition
In this section, we address the case where the firms' service levels are pre-specified. Let f = f 0 denote the vector of exogenously given service levels. We first show that perfect coordination can be achieved with constant per unit wholesale prices. To do so, we first review the equilibrium behavior of the retailers in the infinite horizon game which arises under an arbitrary vector of constant wholesale prices w. In this infinite horizon game, the long-run average profit Π i earned by firm i depends on the N -tuple σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ N ) of infinite horizon (pricing-and inventory replenishment) strategies adopted by all N firms, i.e., Π i = Π i (σ). A Nash equilibrium in this infinite horizon game is an N -tuple of strategies
for all infinite horizon strategies σ i for firm i. Bernstein and Federgruen (2001b) have shown that, under a general and widely satisfied condition with respect to the mean demand functions d i only, an Ntuple of infinite horizon stationary strategies arises as a Nash equilibrium in this infinite horizon game. Under these equilibrium strategies, each retailer i adopts a stationary price p * i and a base-stock policy with (stationary) base-stock level y * i . (Under a base-stock policy, a retailer places an order to increase his inventory level to the base-stock level whenever his inventory has fallen below this level.) Moreover, the vector of equilibrium prices p * is a Nash equilibrium in a single stage game in which each retailer i only chooses a single price
] and his profitπ i (·) depends on the price vector p, according to the (reduced) profit functions:
while the base-stock level y * i is easily determined from p * via
+ , which denotes the expected operational cost required to support one unit of sales (which in the multiplicative model is independent of the sales volume). This definition enables the following simplified representation of the reduced profit functionsπ i (·):
In other words,π i is the product of the expected demand volume d i (p, f 0 ) of firm i and his
Each of the service levels in f 0 has a potential impact on the expected demand value, but only firm i's own service level f 0 i impacts on his profit margin. It is easily verified that the k i (·) functions are differentiable and increasing. We assume, without loss of generality, that lim p ∞πi (p) = 0, and lim p ∞ ∂π i ∂p i (p) < 0. In particular, we assume that the upper limits {p max j } are chosen sufficiently large so that
The above mentioned condition with respect to the mean demand functions {d i } is
This condition is satisfied for most of the commonly used specifications of demand functions which depend on prices only, as well most of the demand models mentioned in §2.
Indeed, the condition holds for all attraction models, since
Condition (A1) is also easily verified to hold for the Linear model, as well as the LogSeparable model as long as
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) identified the Linear, Logit, Cobb-Douglas and CES demand functions which satisfy property (10). The following Lemma summarizes the retailers' equilibrium behavior in the infinite horizon game. Proof. Parts (a) and (b) follow from Theorem 1 in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001b) . The existence, under (A2), of a unique equilibrium in the single stage game and its monotonicity with respect to the vector w, follow from Proposition 1 and Theorem 3, ibid. Assume now, to the contrary, that an alternative infinite horizon strategy results in a Nash equilibrium.
Letp denote the vector of (stationary) prices adopted under this strategy. Ifp = p * , we can replace firm i's (possibly non-stationary, history-dependent) inventory strategy under the considered Nash equilibrium, by the base stock policy with base stock level y * i (p * ), improving his profit level while leaving those of his competitors unchanged. Ifp = p * , observe first that the infinite horizon strategy with stationary price vectorp and base stock policies with base stock levels y * i (p), i = 1, ..., N , is an equilibrium of the infinite horizon game, where the expected profit earned by firm i in each period is given byπ
This implies thatp = p * is a Nash equilibrium in the (reduced) single stage game, which contradicts the fact that p * is the unique equilibrium in the single stage game.
Condition ( 
The Log-Separable model with the four above mentioned classes of the q i -functions, and only minor parameter restrictions (see Bernstein and Federgruen 2001b ).
We thus conclude that under conditions (A1) and (A2), any Nash equilibrium in the infinite horizon game is associated with a unique price vector p * , as long as we restrict ourselves to Nash equilibrium strategies under which each firm adopts a stationary price.
Under condition (A1), the single stage game is (log-)supermodular. This implies that, under conditions (A1) and (A2), the unique equilibrium p * is globally stable, see Vives (2000) . This means that if the market were to start with an arbitrary initial price vector p 0 = p * , the firms would converge to the unique price vector p * when adjusting their prices via the following simple tatônnement scheme: in the k-th iteration, p k is obtained from p k−1 by determining
, each firm i determines the best price response to the current vector of prices p k−1 −i . (The convergence of this scheme also provides for a simple algorithm to compute the unique price equilibrium p * .) Clearly, no retailer chooses a price level p which is strictly dominated by some other price p , i.e., which results in a lower expected profit than p for any of the possible choices of his competitors. Serially undominated strategies are those that survive after iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Since the single-stage game is (log-)supermodular, the unique Nash equilibrium is also the only serially undominated strategy; see Vives (2000, p. 50) .
Consider now the centralized system. Recall, if the supplier has ample capacity and her orders are filled instantaneously, she can passively respond to any retailer orders and fill them completely, upon placement of the orders. In this case the supplier incurs no inventory related costs and the centralized long-run average profit function π I is of the simple form
The situation is considerably more complex if the supplier faces capacity constraints or if she receives her orders, placed at the beginning of a given period, sometime during or at the end of the period. In this case it is necessary to build up inventories in anticipation of future retailer orders and the supplier may find herself out of stock when attempting to fill unexpectedly large retailer orders. Recall that in this more general case, end of the period stock-outs at the supplier are cleared via a back-up source, with additional procurement costs given by the function h
The optimal centralized procurement strategy for the supply chain is unknown and of a prohibitively complex structure, even when assuming that the retailers adopt an exogenously given price vector p, see e.g., Federgruen and Zipkin (1986) and Zipkin (2000) . We therefore restrict ourselves to the following general class of replenishment strategies: the system adopts a stationary retail price vector and each of the retailers adopts a base-stock policy minimizing his own expected cost. Note that a retailer's choice of his base-stock level has no impact on the demand process or costs faced by the supplier or those faced by the other retailers.
Under the combined base-stock policies for the retailers, the supplier faces an i. 
) Given the fact that the retailers adopt some combination of base-stock policies, it is thus optimal to complement these with a replenishment strategy for the supplier which is a (modified) base-stock policy itself, see e.g., Federgruen and Zipkin (1986) . Under a modified base-stock policy, the supplier chooses a base-stock level y 0 and, at the beginning of each period, increases her inventory position to a level as close to the base-stock level as possible, given the capacity limit.
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For a given stationary price vector p, it is easy to compute the optimal base-stock levels, see e.g., Zipkin (2000) . Letπ I (p, f 0 ) denote the expected system-wide long-run average profits under the price vector p and an optimal combination of base-stock strategies for all of the facilities and let C 0 (p, f 0 ) denote the expected holding and emergency procurement costs incurred by the supplier under an optimal inventory replenishment policy. Since C 0 depends on (p, f 0 ) only via the cdfG 0 and since the latter depends on (p, f 0 ) only via the vector of mean demands d, it is possible to write
In some cases, C 0 can be obtained in closed form: consider, for example, the case where the supplier's orders are uncapacitated and her expediting costs are linear with cost rate h − 0 . If the random demand components
is Normal itself and its mean µ 0 (p, f ) and standard deviation σ 0 (p, f ) can be obtained as a closed form function of the functions {d i (p, f )} and the variance-covariance matrix of { i }.
Many supply chain models with exogenously specified demands are based on the assumption that all facilities adopt a base stock policy, see e.g., Graves and Willems (2000) and Ettl et al. (2000) and the references therein. These models have been implemented successfully at various product divisions of Eastman Kodak, IBM and other companies.
e.g., Zipkin (2000, Chapter 6) , with φ(·) and Φ(·) the pdf and cdf of the standard Normal.
For example, when the i -variables are independent, with standard deviation s i , 
where the expression within curled brackets represents the expected profits earned by the supplier. Let p I denote a maximum of this continuous functionπ I (·) on the compact cube
We now show that in this infinite horizon model, perfect coordination can be induced with simple constant wholesale prices. In other words, there exists a vector of wholesale prices w * such that in the resulting retailer game, p I arises as the unique Nash equilibrium. Once again, this result merely requires conditions (A1) and (A2), which guarantee the existence of some unique Nash equilibrium under an arbitrary linear wholesale pricing scheme, see
| be the absolute price elasticity for retailer i. 
Theorem 1 Assume conditions (A1), (A2) apply. (a) There exists a vector
Under (A1) and (A2), the reduced profit functionsπ i are log-concave in the price variable p i for all i = 1, ..., N . (Observe, from (A2), that
This implies that p I is a Nash equilibrium in the retailer game if and only if for all i = 1, ..., N ,
It is easily verified that ∂ 2 logπ i /∂p i ∂w i > 0 under (A1) and (A2). In other words, the function ∂ logπ i /∂p i is strictly increasing in w i . To show the existence of a unique coordinating wholesale price w * (12) is satisfied, it thus suffices to verify that
Finally, the identity for w * i is immediate from (12) and note from Lemma 1(c) that, in view of (A1) and (A2), the vector p I is the unique Nash equilibrium in the retailer game induced by the wholesale pricing vector w * .
(b) Define w
It then follows from our assumption and ∂d j /∂p i ≥ 0, that
Therefore,
The proof of part (a) shows that w * i ≥ w . Only in the "basic" model, where h + i is independent of the wholesale price w i (i.e., when ρ i = 0), is the identity for w * i in the theorem a closed form expression for w * i . This identity also shows that under the coordinating wholesale pricing scheme, each retailer i incurs a total per unit expected cost equal to his retail price p I i , multiplied with a "discount" factor 1 −
which is an increasing function of the retailer's price elasticity, another manifestation of the "inverse elasticity rule" identified in several deterministic single product and multi-product monopoly models, see Tirole (1988, pp. 66, 135, 137, 158) .
The proof of Theorem 1 shows that, under conditions (A1) and (A2), the retailers can be induced to adopt any desired vector of retail prices, and this with a unique vector of wholesale prices w * . Assuming that a fixed vector of retail prices p 0 is targeted, it is of interest to investigate how the coordinating wholesale prices will change in response to a change in one of the firms' service levels f 0 :
Proposition 1 
Proof. Rewrite (12) as:
whered i = log d i . It follows from the Implicit Function Theorem that the coordinating wholesale prices are differentiable functions of the service levels, with the matrix
Here, diag (∆ 1 , ..., ∆ N ) denotes a diagonal matrix, ∆ i the i-th diagonal element and δ ij the Kronecker delta, i.e., δ ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. Part (a) follows therefore directly from the observation that
≤ 0 in each of the models (I), (II) and (III). This is immediate in the Log-Separable model where this secondorder partial derivative is zero. In the Linear model (II),
≤ 0 and in the Attraction model
and since k i (·) ≥ 0, we have
< 0 in the Linear and Log-Separable models where
respectively. In the Attraction model (I),
Note that if the coordinating wholesale price is set to achieve perfect coordination (as opposed to targeting a fixed vector of retail prices), the above monotonicities become less clear, since the vector p I of optimal prices in a centralized system has a complex dependence on the given service level f 0 .
Price Discount Schemes
A series of price discounting schemes (PDS) can be used as an alternative to the (unique) linear scheme, derived above. These schemes can be derived as an application of Groves' (1973) mechanism. This means that we ensure for each retailer i that, when all other retailers choose their prices as in p I , his profit function in the decentralized system is a monotone transformation of the supply chain wide profit functionπ I (·, p I −i ) and therefore has p I i as a maximum. More specifically, for given fractions α i , 0 < α i < 1, we equatẽ , the coordinating wholesale pricing scheme can be written as
where The PDS coordination scheme is clearly of a more complex structure than the linear scheme. In practice, it needs to be implemented via a table, tying the wholesale price to different retail price ranges, see Ailawandi et al. (1999) for concrete examples. The linear pricing scheme has the additional advantage of ensuring p I as the unique Nash equilibrium in the retailer game, a guarantee which cannot be given for the PDS. On the other hand, the PDS scheme induces perfect coordination for all classes of demand functions, while the linear scheme requires the broad, though somewhat restrictive conditions (A1) and (A2). Most importantly, the PDS allows for a continuous menu of schemes by varying the parameters α i from 0 to 1. Any negotiated allocation of the "optimal" supply-chain wide profits among the supplier and the retailers can therefore be achieved by an appropriate choice of the α-vector.
(Under the linear scheme, such profit allocations can only be achieved by periodic transfer payments, e.g., franchise fees.)
Simultaneous Price-and Service Competition
We now turn our attention to the case where the retailers simultaneously compete in terms of their prices and service levels. Here, service levels are endogenously determined as part of the equilibrium strategies of the retailers, as opposed to being specified as exogenous input parameters. In this setting, a simple linear wholesale pricing scheme no longer suffices to coordinate the supply chain. Perfect coordination can, however, be achieved if a linear wholesale pricing scheme is combined with a backlogging penalty scheme under which each retailer pays the supplier a given (possibly negative) penalty for each unit backlogged, in each period. To demonstrate this result, it is therefore again important to review the equilibrium behavior of the retailers in the infinite horizon game which arises under an arbitrary vector of constant per unit wholesale prices w. Once again, the equilibrium behavior in the infinite horizon game is closely related to that in a single stage game. ] and a service level f i ∈ [0, 1), and the reduced profit functions resulting from a chosen price vector p and a chosen service level vector f are given by the right hand sides of (8), with the input parameters f 0 replaced by the decision variables f :
We refer to this single stage game as the "simultaneous single stage game." The following lemma establishes the correspondence between the equilibrium behavior in the infinite horizon game and the above single stage game. 
Lemma 2 (a) Assume
is a Nash equilibrium in the infinite horizon game. Proof. Part (a) follows from Theorem 1 in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001c) . The proof of part (b) is analogous to that of part (c) of Lemma 1.
It is therefore essential to identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous single stage game. These conditions are more specific to the structure of the mean demand functions than condition (A1), which is sufficient to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the model with exogenous service levels, see Lemma 1. We therefore confine ourselves, henceforth, to the three demand models (I) Attraction
Models, (II) Linear Models and (III) Log-Separable Models, introduced in §2.
Contrary to the model with exogenously specified service levels, the sufficient conditions involve not just the structure of the mean demand functions {d i (p, f )}, but require, in addition, a restriction on the distributions of the random factors { i }. In particular, we need to ensure that the function k i (f i ) is convex. Recall that k i (f ) denotes retailer i's expected inventory and backlogging costs per unit of sales, when guaranteeing a service level f .
Lemma 3 (a) k i (·) is increasing and differentiable, with
, for f i ≥ h Proof. See Lemma 1 in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001c) .
Condition (P F 2 ) is trivially satisfied for all distributions whose density function decreases beyond the median, e.g., the Normal and Exponential distributions and many specifications of the Gamma and Weibull distributions. In the remainder of this section, we assume that (P F 2 ) holds. 
Lemma 4 (a) Assume the mean demand functions
and p * the unique solution to the system of equations 
is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Parts (a) and (b) follow from Theorem 3(a) and Theorem 8 in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001c) , respectively. Part (c): note first that the feasible action set of retailer i By Friedman (1977) , a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist if for all i = 1, ..., N , logπ i = log
Joint concavity of the second and third terms is immediate from the assumptions; that of the first term follows from the fact that the margin function (p i − w i − k i (f i )) is jointly concave in (p i , f i ) by Lemma 3, and therefore, a fortiori, log-concave. In addition, since logπ i is jointly concave in (p i , f i ), any solution to the system of equations (22) and
is a Nash equilibrium. Note that the pair {(22), (24)} is equivalent to {(22), (23)}.
Remark 3.
Observe that the class of log-concave attraction functions includes the MNLmodel as a special case or, more generally, functions of the formã
with α i (·) and b i (·) concave. Recall that the MNL is one of the most frequently used demand models, in general, and among the class of attraction models, in particular. For the case of the MNL-model, Theorem 4 in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001c) establishes that the simultaneous single stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium must be an interior point of the feasible action space and must therefore satisfy the first-order conditions {(18), (19)} as its unique solution as well: note from (18) 
where the first inequality follows from (A1) and the second one from (9). Given the uniqueness of an equilibrium in the simultaneous single stage game, the corresponding N -tuple of infinite horizon strategies described in Lemma 2 is, likewise, a unique Nash equilibrium in the infinite horizon game, in the sense described there.
Part (b) of Lemma 4 shows that, just as in the MNL-model, a unique Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in the Linear model. For other types of attraction models, it is harder to guarantee that a unique Nash equilibrium exists: one sufficient condition due to the GailNikaido Theorem involves showing that the 2N × 2N Jacobian consisting of all second order derivatives of logπ i with respect to p and f , be positive definite.
In the Log-Separable model, the requirement that the functions q i (p) be log-concave in p i and ψ i (f i ) in f i , is satisfied, for example, for functions of the Linear, Logit, Cobb-Douglas and CES categories in §2, with minor parameter restrictions. As mentioned in §3, for these four categories of demand functions, we have that the functions q i and ψ i are log-supermodular, i.e., 
The conclusion of part (a) holds. 
The conclusion of part (a) holds.
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, the conditions stated with respect to the attraction functions {a i } in the Attraction Model (see part (a)), or those with respect to the functions {q i (·)} and {ψ i (·)} in the Log-Separable Model (see part (c)), guarantee that, for all three parts (a)-(c),
≥ 0, ensuring that the functions
It therefore suffices to show that the optimal solution for the centralized system (p I , f I ) satisfies the first-order conditions
which in the Attraction Model can be shown to be equivalent to (26) and (27), in the Linear
Model to (29) and (30) and in the Log-Separable Model to (32) and (33).
We therefore first verify that h
.., N in all three models. This is, however, immediate from (25), (28) and (31) respectively, by adding h + i to the expressions for h − * i in (26),(29) and (32) respectively. Moreover, one easily verifies that
, and so that by Lemma 3,
One now verifies, with the help of straightforward algebra, that (p I , f I ) satisfies the first order conditions (34).
We conclude that the coordinating backlogging penalties {h − * i } are always of the form Proof. In the MNL-model, the equilibrium service level vector f * under a given wholesale price vector w and backlogging rate cost vector h − satisfies the first order condition (19):
. On the other hand, under the coordinating scheme in this model, retailer i is charged the wholesale price w * i and a penalty h
A similar argument applies to the Linear Model.
Finally, the existence of a coordinating scheme, under the Attraction Model, is predicated on condition (25). Note that this condition is easily satisfied for sufficiently large service levels
which is always satisfied as long as lim
The factor within squared brackets remains bounded as f i ↑ 1 when, for example,ã i is a separable function (as in the MNL-model), or, a fortiori, when it is submodular, i.e., ∂ 2ã i ∂p i ∂f i ≤ 0, since in these cases the factor is in fact positive and decreasing in f i . Similarly, the parallel conditions (28) and (31) are satisfied for sufficiently large service levels {f Observe that the coordinating wholesale prices w * are always specified to provide the retailers a positive margin, i.e., p Thus, wholesale prices are discounted on the basis of expected sales volumes. Our model thus provides an economic rationale for this most prevalent type of discounting, even though the cost structure may fail to exhibit any economies of scale with respect to the retailers' sales volumes. A similar observation was made in Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) for an infinite horizon model with deterministic demands. Finally, it is possible to generalize the PDS (15), but only with a complex dependence on the retailer's price and service level.
Numerical Study
In this Section, we report on the following numerical studies:
(a) We provide a comparison of the supply chain performance under price competition and under combined price-and service competition with respect to each other, and with respect to the first-best (optimal centralized solution). We compare retail prices, sales volumes and profits, as well as aggregate profits in the supply chain. (c) We report the parameters of the coordination schemes. When service levels are exogenously given, we confine ourselves to the linear wholesale pricing scheme that achieves perfect coordination and illustrate how the coordinating wholesale prices depend on the service level vector f 0 . We also illustrate what backlogging rates need to be charged in the pricing scheme under combined price-and service competition.
(d) We investigate how specific changes in the demand functions and cost parameteres impact on the supply chain performance in the centralized system, in a decentralized system with price competition, and in a decentralized system with combined price-and service competition. In making these comparisons, we pay attention to all of the performance measures listed under (a). For each of the 10 scenarios, we have computed both the centralized and decentralized solution, each for a total of 1,000 service level combinations. These combinations are obtained by varying the service level of each firm on the grid [0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.96, 0.97, 0.98, 0.99] .
(A finer grid is chosen for f ≥ 0.9, since the cost functions k i (·) are highly non-linear and rapidly increasing on the interval [0.9, 1).) It is very hard to determine the global optimum (p I , f I ) of the centralized system since the centralized profit function π I typically has many local optima. On the other hand, the restricted profit function π I (·, f 0 ) is well-behaved and appears unimodal, for any given vector of service levels f 0 . We thus determine (p I , f I ) as the service level vector f 0 which, along with the best corresponding retail prices, results in the largest system-wide profit value among all 1,000 grid points.
In the base scenario, f I = (0.7, 0.98, 0.98). with the same 4 alternative service levels.) The table displays the optimal prices and corresponding sales volumes for the three retailers, and the aggregate optimal profits in the supply chain. In Table 2 , we evaluate for the same 10 vectors f 0 , the unique equilibrium which arises in the decentralized system. After listing the equilibrium prices, mean sales quantities and expected profit of each of the retailers, we report the coordinating wholesale prices (under the given vector of service levels).
Observe that the profit in the centralized system is significantly larger than the aggregate of the equilibrium profits achieved in a decentralized system. Differences of 8% or more All of these effects become even more pronounced when w c or w p I .
Combined price-and service competition causes Retailers 2 and 3 to implement a further price reduction, along with a reduction of the service level from 0.98 to 0.90. Their price is now 17% lower than in the globally optimal centralized solution. The equilibrium sales volumes for Retailers 2 and 3 under combined price-and service competition are approxi- The coordinating wholesale prices generate significant gross profit margins (w * −c) for the supplier which are sometimes larger, but sometimes smaller than the gross retailer margins (p I −w * ). When, e.g., f 0 = f I , the margin vectors are ($3.2, $7.0, $7.0) and ($5.0, $5.4, $5.4) .
Consider now the impact of a change in one of the service levels in f 0 on the coordinating wholesale prices. As an example, take f 0 = f I . With f In scenario (III), only c 12 changes. Its reduction from 7 to 5 results in f I 2 going down from 98% to 95%, combined with a one percentage point decrease in f In scenario (IV), the total price sensitivity b We next characterize four additional scenarios, obtained from the base scenario (I) by incorporating the following changes: (VII) β 1 = 80; (VIII) β 1 = 120; (IX) all γ ij = −30, i = j;
The first six scenarios assume that each of the firms has identical sensitivities with respect to the service levels. In scenarios (VII) and (VIII) we decrease and increase the coefficient β 1 = ∂d 1 /∂f 1 to a level lower and one higher than the corresponding values of the competitors (or that of β 1 in the base scenario). The former case represents a setting where Firm 1's customers are significantly more price-sensitive but care less about service than those of the competitors. In the latter case, Firm 1's customers are more demanding with respect to both attributes. Scenario (IX) represents a setting with increased service-level competition. Finally, in scenario (X), we asses what impact the inventory-related cost parameters at the supplier have on the centralized and decentralized solutions.
In scenario (VII), β 1 is reduced to 80 so that Firm 1's customers exhibit now considerably weaker sensitivity to the firm's service level along with significantly larger sensitivity to the prevailing prices. In the centralized solution, Firm 1 reduces his service level from 0.7 to 0.5, while the equilibrium service level f * 1 reduces more modestly from 0.79 to 0.73. The reduced service level f In scenario (VIII), the above changes are reversed: it is now optimal to increase f I 1 from 0.7 to 0.8 and f * 1 from 0.79 to 0.83. Accordingly, it is now optimal in the optimal solution to increase one of the other service levels (f In spite of the fact that Firm 1's price increase is significantly larger than those of the other firms, the combined increase of β 1 from 100 to 120 and that of f I from 0.7 to 0.8, has a dominating effect on Firm 1's expected sales level, while those of Firms 2 and 3 both decline. Aggregate sales increase by close to 10%; along with the price increases, this results in a 17% increase in aggregate profits. Once again, the impact on the decentralized equilibrium p * (f I ) is more modest; note that the firm that maintains a service level of 0.98 sees a minor increase of its sales volume along with a (minor) increase of its price, the impact of which is dominated by the more significant increase in the prices of the other two firms. Scenario (IX) represents a setting with increased service competition in the sense that changes in any of the service levels now have a 50% larger impact on the sales of the two remaining firms. The equilibrium service levels f * = (0.79, 0.90, 0.90) are not affected by this change in the γ-coefficients, but in the centralized solution the increase in the service level cross elasticities results in a large decrease in f I 1 (from 0.7 to 0.5) and a modest decline in the service levels of Firms 2 and 3 (from 0.98 to 0.96). These service level reductions are accompanied by significant price reductions of approximately $3 each. All of the sales volumes decline, but primarily those of Firm 1 whose service level is most affected by the increase in the γ-coefficients (the latter decreases by more than 40%). Aggregate sales in the centralized solution drop by 11% and profits by more than 50%. Once again, all of the equilibrium prices in p * (f I ) decline as well, although more modestly than the decreases in p I . Even so, the relative decline in the sales volumes of Firms 2 and 3 is much larger than in the centralized solution while that of Firm 1 is comparable.
In our last scenario (X), investigates the impact of a five fold increase in the inventory- 
Conclusions
We have addressed a general model for two-echelon supply chains with N competing retailers served by a common supplier. Each retailer's stochastic demand function depends on his own retail price, as well as those of all of his competitors, but also on the service levels guaranteed by the N firms. The firm's service level is defined as its no-stockout frequency.
Most of our analysis has focused on three basic classes of stochastic demand functions which depend on the vector of retail prices p and the vector of service levels f , i.e., the Attraction Models, the Linear Models and the Log-Separable Models.
Focusing first on the case where the firms' service levels are exogenously specified, we have shown that perfect coordination can be achieved either by a simple linear wholesale pricing scheme (with constant per unit wholesale prices) or by a so-called (non-linear) Price Discount
Scheme. While the latter scheme is more complex, it has the advantage of allowing for a continuous menu of schemes. Any negotiated allocation of the "optimal supply chain wide profits" among the supplier and the retailers can therefore be achieved by an appropriate choice of the parameters in this menu of schemes. In addition, the PDS is applicable in full generality while the linear wholesale pricing scheme requires a few regularity conditions.
When service levels are endogenously determined, i.e., when the retailers simultaneously compete in terms of their prices and their service levels, coordination can again be achieved, under minor regularity conditions, with a linear wholesale pricing scheme, albeit that this wholesale pricing scheme needs to be combined with a set of constant per unit backlogging penalties to be paid by the retailers to the supplier, or vice versa. (The generalization of the above PDS is, in principle, possible but results in an overly complex pricing scheme.)
An important assumption in our paper, common to most stochastic inventory models, is that stockouts at the retailers are fully backlogged. It is of interest to consider the alternative setting where stockouts result in lost sales. Assume first that the retailers do not guarantee any particular service level, so that the mean demand functions d i only depend on the vector of retail prices p, i.e., d i = d i (p). In this case, it can again be shown that, under a vector of constant wholesale prices, a Nash equilibrium of infinite horizon strategies exists in which each retailer adopts a stationary price and a stationary base stock policy, provided a Nash equilibrium exists in a single stage game with profit functions:
This single stage game has been analyzed in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001a) . Theorem 4 there shows indeed that this single stage game has a unique equilibrium vector p * which is monotone in the vector of wholesale prices w, under conditions (A1) and (A2) and an additional condition with respect to the shape of the distributions {G i } of the error factors
The condition is widely satisfied, e.g., for Exponentials and Normal distributions with coefficient of variation less than or equal to one.) Under these conditions, it is possible to show that, as in the case of full backlogging, perfect coordination can be achieved with a linear wholesale pricing scheme. If the retailers guarantee specific service levels, the situation is more complex, either when these service levels are exogenously specified or when the retailers engage in simultaneous price and service-competition, and it is no longer possible to guarantee the existence of a coordinating wholesale pricing scheme. (The difficulty results from the fact that the functionπ i has no longer increasing differences in p i and w i .)
